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Abstract:  
 
The clash of ignorance thesis presents a critique of the clash of civilizations 
theory. It challenges the assumptions that civilizations are monolithic entities that 
do not interact and that the Self and the Other are always opposed to each other. 
Despite some significantly different values and clashes between Western and 
Muslim civilizations, they overlap with each other in many ways and have 
historically demonstrated the capacity for fruitful engagement. The clash of 
ignorance thesis makes a significant contribution to the understanding of 
intercultural and international communication as well as to the study of inter-
group relations in various other areas of scholarship. It does this by bringing 
forward for examination the key impediments to mutually beneficial interaction 
between groups. The thesis directly addresses the particular problem of ignorance 
that other epistemological approaches have not raised in a substantial manner. 
Whereas the critique of Orientalism deals with the hegemonic construction of 
knowledge, the clash of ignorance paradigm broadens the inquiry to include 
various actors whose respective distortions of knowledge symbiotically promote 
conflict with each other. It also augments the power-knowledge model to provide 
conceptual and analytical tools for understanding the exploitation of ignorance for 
the purposes of enhancing particular groups’ or individuals’ power. Whereas 
academics, policymakers, think tanks, and religious leaders have referred to the 
clash of ignorance concept, this essay contributes to its development as a theory 
that is able to provide a valid basis to explain the empirical evidence drawn from 
relevant cases. 
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Résumé: 
 
La thèse du choc des ignorances présente une critique de la théorie du choc des 
civilisations. Elle met en question les présuppositions selon lesquelles les 
civilisations sont des entités monolithiques qui n’interagissent pas et le Soi et 
l’Autre toujours opposés. Malgré de considérables différences de valeurs et 
plusieurs chocs enregistrés entre les civilisations musulmane et occidentale, elles 
se chevauchent cependant de plusieurs façons et ont démontré par le passé leur 
capacité d’interagir de manière fructueuse. La thèse du choc des ignorances 
propose une importante contribution à la compréhension de la communication 
interculturelle et internationale ainsi qu’à l’étude des relations inter-groupales 
dans divers domaines de recherche. Notamment par l’examen des obstacles les 
plus significatifs à l’interaction positive entre les groupes en question. Cette thèse 
s’intéresse particulièrement au problème de l’ignorance que d’autres approches 
épistémologiques n’ont pas suffisamment soulevé. Alors que la critique de 
l’Orientalisme s’occupe de la construction hégémonique du savoir, le paradigme 
du choc de l’ignorance élargit l’espace de son investigation pour inclure divers 
acteurs dont la distorsion des connaissances respectives promeut le conflit de 
manière constitutive. Ce même paradigme développe également le modèle 
pouvoir-savoir en vue de proposer des outils conceptuels et analytiques pour 
comprendre l’exploitation de l’ignorance aux fins d’accroître le pouvoir de 
certains groupes ou individus. Là où chercheurs, législateurs, experts et chefs 
religieux n’ont fait que référer au concept du choc des ignorances, cet essai tente 
en revanche de contribuer à son développement comme théorie en vue de 
proposer un fondement valide pour expliquer les données empiriques réunies des 
diverses études pertinentes. 
 
Mots-clés:  Choc;  Civilisation;  Communication Interculturelle; Conflit; 
Connaissance; Ignorance; Islam; L’Autre; L’Occident; Orientalisme; 
Pouvoir; Sociétés Occidentales et Musulmanes  
 
 
 
 
And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 
“Dover Beach”—Matthew Arnold (1867: 114) 
 
 
The first decade of the 21
st  century began with a violent confrontation that will probably 
continue for a long time. The Global Media Journal -- Canadian Edition’s September 2011 issue 
carried out a review of the ten years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It 
noted that the significant amount of research conducted on the global conflict had yielded little 
understanding about the relationship between Western and Muslim societies (Eid & Karim, 
2011). Indeed, it has been ignorance on both sides that appears to have fuelled the ongoing clash. Clash of Ignorance  9 
This essay builds on the previous issue by exploring this “clash of ignorance”
1, a term which is 
increasingly used around the world to denote conflict that arises from the failure of intercultural 
communication and understanding. Whereas academics, policymakers, and religious leaders 
have referred to this concept, it has yet to be developed as a theory that is able to provide a valid 
basis to explain the empirical evidence drawn from relevant cases. The clash of ignorance 
critique of the clash of civilizations thesis offers a unique epistemological potential  for 
multidisciplinary  research on intercultural  and international interactions. This essay seeks to 
strengthen the concept’s theoretical foundation by reflecting upon some of its key ideas; it does 
this primarily by examining the particular context in which it has been formulated—that of 
conflicts between Western and Muslim societies.  
Contemporary humanity’s vaunted claims to knowledge have not lifted it from irrational 
behaviour. Fear, loathing, and, above all, ignorance, influence the terrorist and military actions 
that continue to cause mayhem. Whereas many in Western and Muslim societies seek peace and 
co-operation, “religious illiteracy” (Asani, 2003) and cultural ignorance about the Other lies at 
the basis of continuing  clashes between them. Influential academics and policymakers have 
chosen to put aside the vast store of knowledge about the many productive interactions between 
the two civilizations over hundreds of years. The common Abrahamic roots of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam as well as of contemporary Western philosophy offer the basis for mutual 
understanding at a profound level (e.g., Arkoun, 1994; Lorca, 2003; Neusner, Chilton & Graham, 
2002). However, the myopic vision and short-term goals shaped by narrow self-interest prompts 
ideologues and propagandists to magnify differences and forgo the exploration of commonalities. 
It would be incorrect to disregard the historical series of conflicts between Western and 
Muslim societies, but they have come to occupy an inordinately large space in collective 
memories  about  the centuries-long relationship. Despite having some significantly different 
values, Western and Muslim civilizations overlap with each other in many ways and have 
demonstrated the capacity for fruitful engagement (Goody, 2004; Hobson, 2004). It is 
unfortunate that our time is marked by an escalation of the clash to a global scale, in spite of a 
mountain of academic research produced on the shared Abrahamic heritage and the long history 
of collaborative relationships. Much of the interaction between Western and Muslim societies is 
characterized by a mutual lack of awareness regarding history and culture. Ignoring the store of 
gathered knowledge has enhanced the state of ignorance. Even as humanity trumpets its 
achievements in science and technology, it remains mired in what some believe is a necessary 
contest between good and evil. Weapons wrought with technical knowledge are used to wage 
wars conceived in cultural ignorance. 
The clash of civilizations thesis,  developed by Samuel Huntington (1993; 1996) and 
adopted as a primary framework for foreign policy formulation, disregards the complexity of 
human identities and relationships. To present the hugely pluralist “West” and “Islam” as static, 
monolithic entities is to misunderstand the dynamics of culture. Evolving relationships between 
sections of different civilizations produce shifting parameters of belonging. There exist widely-
held, albeit vague, notions of what constitutes a civilization and what conglomeration of groups a 
particular civilization contains. Close scrutiny reveals many unresolved questions about who is 
to be included or  excluded  in a civilization; the internal debates on what sets of identities 
comprise the Self and the Other often give rise to some of the most bitter quarrels. Therefore, a 
thesis that presents a world neatly divided into well-defined and discrete civilizational blocs and 
then pits them against each other is dangerously simple-minded. It is a view of the world shared 
with the ideologues who wilfully ignore intercultural links to pursue a path of conflict. Several Karim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid   10 
commentators (e.g., Aga Khan, 2002, June 23; Al-Nahayan, 2005, April 8; Ferrero-Waldner, 
2006, March 27; Said, 2001, October 22; Tauran, 2012, March 17) have noted that the clash of 
civilizations thesis does not provide an informed way to analyse the conflict between segments 
of Western and Muslim civilizations. They suggest that its causes can be understood as 
stemming largely from ignorance rather than being inevitable and endemic outcomes of cultural 
or religious difference. Left unchallenged, the prevailing cultural ignorance will continue to 
cloud the analysis of unfolding events and most likely perpetuate senseless conflict.  
This  essay explores some of the fundamental causes behind the clashes born of 
ignorance. It challenges the assumption that the Self and the Other are inescapably and always 
opposed to each other. This widespread notion has shaped the imagining of interactions between 
the two as being inexorably conflictual, despite the primary relationships between them that tend 
towards productive engagement. The essay also examines how the clash of ignorance is 
supported by a terminology that presents complex social formations in monolithic categories. For 
example, the terms “the West” and “Islam” generally tend to connote civilizational entities that 
are culturally sealed off from each other. We argue that clashes are often produced by ignorance 
of one’s historical and cultural relationships with others. There appears to be in contemporary 
academic, governmental, educational, media, and public discourses a sidelining of the vast body 
of evidence demonstrating harmonious and productive interactions between Jews, Christians, and 
Muslims. Despite the fundamental weaknesses of the clash of civilizations thesis, it has been 
widely accepted as correctly identifying the inevitability of conflict between Western and 
Muslim societies. As if in a self-fulfilling prophecy, the first decade of the 21
st century saw the 
maiming and killing of hundreds of thousands of people, tearing apart of families and 
communities, destruction of property on a vast scale, and expenditure of hundreds of billions of 
dollars. The causes are not to be found in an unavoidable clash of civilizations but in ignorance.  
 
Self and Other 
 
It is human tendency to divide the world into Self and Other. Such concepts operate in the mind 
as primary organizing ideas that influence frameworks of discourse about social relationships 
(van Dijk, 1980). They are mental containers for a series of images that range from  the 
microcosmic to the macrocosmic: the Self can be thought of as the first person subject or as the 
entire universe and, similarly, the Other as the second person object or as nature. The worldview 
of each culture and the circumstances of its particular discourses at a given time shape the 
specific identity of the entities that are placed within these cognitive frameworks. At different 
times, the Self can be I, my family, my football team, my neighbourhood, my culture, my ethnic 
group, my religious group, my country, or humanity. Similarly, the Other can be a spouse, an 
adjacent community, a neighbouring state, another civilization, or nature. An entity that is 
viewed as  an  Other in one context comes to be  seen as part of the Self in an  alternative 
placement; for example, a rival state is incorporated into the larger Self in the situations where 
one identifies with all of humanity. 
Engagement with the Other occurs in the terms of how it is imagined by the Self. It is 
common to think of the former as a threat to the latter, but this is not fundamental to their 
relationship. The Bible exhorts: “love thy neighbour as thyself” (Leviticus,  19:  18) and the 
Qur’an encourages nations to “know one another” (49:  13). The work of the philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas was important in initiating the contemporary discussion on radical Otherness. 
However, he does not favour the idea of the Other as a rival or an enemy, which has come to Clash of Ignorance  11 
prevail in dominant discourses. Levinas (1969) raises the notion of the ethical demand that the 
appearance of the Other poses to the Self: “The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not 
in a shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness” (1969: 150). This 
would reflect the relationship of the religious believer to God, the context in which Levinas 
primarily wrote. However, it is true of other situations as well. In many cases, the Other is the 
foil that enhances the existence of the Self (Kristeva, 1986). Whether hostile or not, the former is 
usually the entity in relation to which the latter defines itself wholly or partially, depending on 
the context of interaction. Human existence is filled with the tension of differences. But this 
tension is often a creative force that is a vital source of life’s dynamism. The Self, in some cases, 
may seek to unite with the Other, seeing its destiny as the fulfilment of such coming together. 
Unions of the male and the female and of the human worshiper and the divine are among the 
primary themes in art, music, and literature.  
At the beginnings of individual consciousness, a baby begins to realise that she is distinct 
from her mother—with whom she has shared an intimate sense of Self. The infant becomes 
aware of her own characteristics in relation to Others, and in this develops the conception of a 
separate identity. Her gender and age become pertinent features in relationships with members of 
her family. She mentally integrates individual and collective notions (stereotypes) of the Self in 
relation to Other entities: she is taught that she belongs to an extended Self based on gender, 
kinship, culture, ethnicity, religion, class, and nationality—social categories that may or may not 
overlap with each other. She learns to deal with the apparent contradictions in which certain 
people may be considered part of the extended Self in some contexts but not in others.  
Conflict is integral to the human condition (Girard, 1979) and every relationship holds 
the possibility of a clash. It can reach the most dangerous and destructive stage (i.e., a crisis or a 
war) if it is escalated or gets out of control (Eid, 2008a). Severe stress situations differ in 
characteristics from one another (Ibid); however, they all include a form or a state of 
confrontation or clash. The  avoidance, management, or resolution of  a  clash provides a 
movement forwards. But a clash can also lead to the deterioration of relations. When the Other is 
viewed in a hostile manner, the Self tends to take up an aggressive stance towards it. Groups 
usually adopt belligerent positions against the Others whom they view as a danger to their own 
existence. Their goal tends to become the reduction or the destruction of the threat, which 
sometimes can mean elimination of the people who are seen as posing the menace. In many 
cases, the opposing parties who view the Other as a threat to the respective Self continually feed 
on each other’s fears, giving rise to a growing spiral of aggression. In this zero-sum game, the 
Self views itself as necessarily losing out when the Other enjoys a benefit—it becomes 
inconceivable for both to have gains through cooperation (non-zero-sum game). This is one of 
the major reasons why it is usually very difficult to bring two warring parties to the negotiating 
table. 
Rival groups, often prompted by their leaders, develop mirror images of each other, as 
happened during the Cold War between NATO and the Soviet bloc. Both sides come to view the 
Other in similar manners—as untrustworthy and ill-meaning. On the other hand, the Self is 
viewed in positive terms as seeking to do good. The actions of the Other, no matter how benign, 
are usually interpreted through negative perspectives. Each side launches reciprocal propagandic 
attacks against its Other. Despite these similarities in behaviour, both ironically see each other as 
being at the polar opposite. The Self’s media and other channels of public discourse are key 
elements in disseminating the images that often mirror those produced by the Other. Robert Ivie 
(1980), who examined American portrayals of the national Self and the series of Others with Karim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid   12 
whom it engaged in war over the course of two hundred years, found a remarkable consistency in 
their characterization: the U.S. was always peace-seeking and defensive while the enemy was 
always belligerent and warlike. Such characterizations form the bases of the topoi that generate 
stereotypes (Karim, 2003a). Western media depictions of Muslims over the last few decades 
reveals a dramatic increase in the use of stereotypes and discriminatory rhetoric (Eid, 2008b; 
Hirji, 2011; Jiwani; 2011; Karim 2003a). Such coverage frequently relates the teachings of Islam 
to terrorism, destruction, and conflict. Similar forms of stereotyping and disparagement can be 
found in some  Muslim portrayals of Western societies (Abdel-Malek, 2000; Ford, 2012; 
Ghanoonparvar, 1993). 
Hostile tendencies between Self and Other tend to disregard the multiplicity of hybrid 
fusions that emerge through contact between different social groups (Bhabha, 1994). There is a 
deliberate effort, frequently on the part of societal elites, to emphasize distinctions with the Other 
in order to enhance the unity of the Self. Every single person in the extended Self is expected to 
conform in her personal identification against the Other. Communal identity is maintained in 
categories of essentialized (ethnic, racial, religious, or ideological) purity; great lengths are taken 
to avoid “contamination” from contact with the Other. Some examples are the reservations to 
which North American aboriginal peoples were historically confined, the separation of “racial” 
groups under South African apartheid, the traditional caste-based practices in India, as well as 
the extreme suspicion during the Cold War of communist values in NATO states and capitalist 
ones in  Warsaw Pact countries. Such  thinking suppresses the subtle and overt linkages that 
people of varying backgrounds develop with each other over time. 
A key motivation on the part of certain leaders is to divide and rule. In fabricating or 
exaggerating a threat from another group, some elites seek to convince their community about 
their own indispensability by promoting the belief that it is only they who will be able to protect 
the population. This is intended to reinforce their positions of power. A common tactic is to 
present the Self as good and the Other as evil. Such essentialization helps set up a situation in 
which the faults of the Self, particularly the elites, tend to be hidden under the veil of goodness 
as those of the Other are exaggerated. In this absolute scenario, the Self can do no evil and the 
Other can do no good. Indeed, in the most extreme cases, they become personifications of good 
and evil. When this happens, it becomes easier to carry out and justify massive harm to the 
Other. With the effective use of the mass media by the elites, large sections of the nation are 
brought to acquiesce to genocide (as happened in Nazi Germany, the former Yugoslavia, and 
Rwanda). Notions of “the evil empire” and “the axis of evil” have also helped leaders rally 
populations against other countries. Once an Other has been labelled as a “rogue” state or 
“terrorist” group, fewer justifications have to be made when brutal military action is taken 
against it (Karim, 2003a). 
It would be incorrect to suggest that societal leaders are always bent on fomenting 
discord. Contemporary governments are often engaged in sustaining harmony between the 
people of diverse characteristics who are part of society. This was not necessarily the case until 
the mid-twentieth century due to the entrenched concept  of the nation-state as consisting 
primarily, if not solely, of a population that was similar in language, culture, ethnicity, and 
religion. A number of factors have brought about the willingness to deal positively with various 
aspects of pluralism within a country. Current patterns of migration have given rise to 
populations which have an unprecedented level of diversity. Whereas in the past newcomers 
would usually be absorbed culturally into receiving societies, the scale of human relocations as 
well as the ability to maintain one’s social and cultural characteristics has grown due to factors Clash of Ignorance  13 
like the availability of media (film, video, satellite television, the Internet, telephony) and 
transportation that provide continual links with the land of origin and its diasporic communities 
(Karim, 2003b). Additionally, the human rights movement that emerged in the mid-20
th century 
has helped to assert the legitimacy of minorities within states and has led to the emergence of 
policies, such as multiculturalism, which provide enabling mechanisms for migrants to maintain 
and cultivate their cultural forms. It has also encouraged the recognition of multi-layered 
identities that many individuals have as well as of hybrid cultures. Trends of internationalism 
have also encouraged the coming together of various states under umbrella organizations such as 
the United Nations. Nevertheless, the polarizing tendencies of othering have not disappeared and 
often continue to divide groups and countries. As in most other public debates, it is in media 
content  where the competition of these discourses unfolds. Whereas progressive journalists 
produce materials that are respectful of diversity and encourage intercultural/international 
understanding, others knowingly or unknowingly exploit differences and stereotypes. The latter 
tendencies compound the already existing states of cultural ignorance and make possible clashes 
within and among societies. 
 
“The West” and “Islam”  
 
The ways in which “the West” and “Islam” are conceptualized in dominant discourses are deeply 
problematic. They have been presented as inimical geopolitical entities locked in a deadly 
struggle. These complex and changing social entities are constructed as being monolithic and 
static in their composition. Like other human groupings, they are what Benedict Anderson 
(1983) has called “imaginary communities”—imagined as existing in particular forms by their 
own members and by others. The general idea of “the West” as a unitary civilization with a 
singular  cultural connection to the history of Western Europe begins to break down when 
examined closely. The social geographer Alastair Bonnett notes that “‘the West’ is a highly 
expandable category” (2004: 5). It is usually imagined as geographically encompassing Western 
Europe, North America, and Australasia—drawing together disparate jurisdictions like Hawaii, 
Nunavut, Malta, Bulgaria, and Norway into a composite whole. Such places have relationships in 
their own historical, geographical, political, social, and economic contexts that also relate them 
to other regions of the world. The Hawaiian archipelago, which has become part of “the West” as 
a state of the United States, is located in the middle of the Pacific Ocean almost 4,000 kilometres 
from the North American mainland and on the other side of the planet from Europe. The vast 
majority of the population of the large northern Canadian territory of Nunavut is aboriginal and 
has little relationship with the cultural heritage of Europe. Malta, which is a member of the 
European Union, is located in the Mediterranean Sea and has strong historical and cultural 
connections with North Africa. The central European country of Bulgaria, which is now a 
member of NATO and the EU, was previously an Ottoman principality and, during the Cold 
War, a signatory to the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, Norway, which has extensive cultural 
ties with countries in the western part of Europe, has chosen not to be a member of the EU. 
Conversely, Mexico, which is geographically within North America and linked economically to 
Canada and the United States through NAFTA, is generally not considered to be part of “the 
West”. Despite these anomalies, the notion of “the West” as a stable and well-defined region of 
the world, distinct from all others, persists. Edward Said asks,  
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How can one today speak of “Western civilization” except as in large measure an 
ideological fiction, implying a sort of detached superiority for a handful of values 
and ideas, none of which has much meaning outside the history of conquest, 
immigration, travel, and the mingling of peoples that gave the Western nations 
their present identities? 
(Said, 1994: 347) 
 
This may sound reductionist, but it is clear that as a civilizational entity, “the West” should be 
understood as  a changing, porous, overlapping, multicultural, and contradictory 
conglomeration—features which are also present in other civilizations. 
The vast majority of the people of Europe have Christian or post-Christian identities. This 
is a core characteristic of the region’s definition in the minds of many of its residents, and is 
contributing to resistance in admitting Turkey to the EU (Does “Muslim” Turkey . . . , 2005). 
The history of Muslims in Europe is more than 1,300 years long. In 2010, they numbered 44.1 
million in the continent, growing by 4.1% in ten years; they are projected to exceed 58 million 
by 2030 (The future of . . . , 2011). There has also been a long presence of Jews in Europe, 
whose other inhabitants include Bahais, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, and Zoroastrians. A similar 
diversity exists in Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. A realistic notion of 
“the West” has to acknowledge the significant and growing presence of its ethnically non-
European and religiously non-Christian minorities. 
Uses of the term “Islam” as a singular civilization or geopolitical bloc are also 
misleading. Similar to constructions of “the West”, “Islam” is also generally imagined as a fixed 
entity of a clearly demarcated religion and a well-defined global set of adherents. It is often 
presented as acting as a monolith and also being acted upon by Others as a singly-constituted 
object. Mohammed Arkoun remarks that “[w]e can no longer use the word ‘Islam’ without 
quotation marks. It has been so misused and distorted by the media, Muslims themselves, and 
political scientists that we need a radical reworking of the concept” (Arkoun, 1990: 50). “Islam” 
has appeared as a timeless phenomenon—unchanging and static—in the discourses of both 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Actions that took place a thousand years ago are selectively chosen 
to provide explanations of the contemporary political stances of Muslim-majority governments 
or Muslim insurgents (Karim, 2003a). Dominant Western presentations of “Islam” are often 
caricatures of its most militant adherents, whose voices have tended to become the loudest in the 
broad range of Muslim opinions. This has come to make “the word Islam . . . sound to western 
ears like a rattlesnake’s rattle” (Bulliet, 2004: 133). Terms such as “Muslim”, “Sunni”, and 
“Shia” have often become ways to sound alarms rather than to denote practitioners of a faith. 
Composite terms like “the Muslim world” or the Islamic ideal of the ummah as a unified 
global body of Muslims are assumed to be sociological and political realities upon which theory 
can be based, policies made, and actions undertaken. Whereas the followers of Islam adhere to a 
set of beliefs in common, there remains a diversity that exists not only in cultural but also 
religious practice among the billion and half Muslims living around the world (Hirji, 2010). 
Many Sunnis and Shia often do not consider groups such as the Druze, Ahmedis, and Bahais to 
be Muslim; more exclusivist tendencies among certain Sunnis also remove the 165 million Shia 
from the Islamic fold, and some Shia hold Sunnis as unbelievers. The term “Muslim world” is 
often viewed as referring to majority-Muslim states, thus excluding the hundreds of millions of 
Muslims who live in India;  China;  eastern,  western, and southern Africa;  Europe;  North 
America; and elsewhere. Conversely, the presence of the tens of millions of Christians, Hindus, Clash of Ignorance  15 
Jews, Sikhs, Zoroastrians, agnostics, atheists, and others who live in majority-Muslim countries 
is obscured by calling the latter “Muslim” or “Islamic” countries. The hybridity of belief and 
practice (Khan, 2005) that resists the categorization of individuals or families into sealed off 
religious compartments is also often not recognized.  
Marshall Hodgson used the term “Islamicate” to be inclusive of the religious diversity of 
majority-Muslim societies: it “would refer not directly to the religion, Islam, itself, but to the 
social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among 
Muslims themselves and even when found among  non-Muslims” (Hodgson, 1974: 59). The 
many contributions of Christians, Jews, Hindus, Zoroastrians, and others to Muslim civilizations 
are recognized through such a term. It points to the confluence of faiths, cultures, and ethnicities 
comprising  the public cultures of the Ummayad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Safavid, Mughal, and 
Ottoman territories as well as of contemporary majority-Muslim states. The idea of a single 
monolithic Muslim civilization is made redundant, given the vast diversity of material conditions 
and cultures in places such as Aceh, Afghanistan, Albania, Alberta, Algeria, Anatolia, Arabia, 
Australia, and Azerbaijan.  
The geopolitical terms “the West” and “Islam” have locked the imagination into narrow 
ways of thinking about complex realities. They tend to prevent the consideration of the vast 
pluralism that exists in both, and the acknowledgement that they are constructed entities whose 
individual components have had long-standing relationships across what are considered to be 
civilizational borders. Indeed, Richard Bulliet (2004) makes an intriguing case for an “Islamo-
Christian civilization” based on the many commonalities in outlook as well as the many 
harmonious interactions between Christians and Muslims  (also see: Karić,  2011). The 
essentialization of the terms “the West” and “Islam” as denoting completely separate monoliths 
erases past lessons and future scope for productive engagement; instead of being heuristic 
categories that enable the building of knowledge, they become the means for disseminating 
misinformation and ignorance.  
 
Christian-Muslim Engagements 
 
Christians and Muslims have had ongoing interactions almost since the emergence of Islam, 
some  14  centuries ago, and have significantly influenced the development of each other’s 
civilizations. However, the knowledge about these exchanges is either non-existent, sketchy, or 
considered irrelevant in contemporary Western and Muslim societies. Tendencies on both sides 
to polarize the portrayals of Self and Other have left little room for acknowledging how they 
have historically worked together. The early development of Islamic theology was significantly 
influenced by Christian and other traditions of knowledge, and the later  scientific and 
philosophical advancements of Muslims were crucial in giving impetus to the European 
Renaissance. Western and Muslim powers engaged in war against each other from time to time; 
however, there were extensive periods of collaboration between them. Indeed, cultural exchanges 
and political alliances were not uncommon even during the Crusades (Fletcher, 2003). There was 
extensive trade across the Mediterranean and along the  routes between the lands ruled by 
Christians and Muslims.  
When Muslim Arabs initially encountered the learned cultures of neighbouring regions, 
they were eager to follow the Prophet Muhammad’s counsel to acquire knowledge wherever it 
existed. This region was part of the vibrant Hellenic world where the works of philosophy, 
science, religion, literature, music, and art were studied. The openness of Muslims to other Karim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid   16 
cultures provided for their own intellectual flowering. It comes as a surprise to contemporary 
Muslims that certain key aspects of the Islamic faith which have become integral to its structures 
of belief owe their development to scholarly methods derived from other civilizations. The only 
textual sources that emerged from Muhammad’s time were the Qur’an and the Hadith  (the 
Prophet’s  sayings). In the next few centuries, Muslims developed the basis of  Islamic 
jurisprudence  (fiqh), theology (kalam) and philosophy (falsafa). However, the production of 
these bodies of work required the intellectual tools of analysis and philosophical reasoning which 
Muslims acquired from others (Fakhry, 1983). Aspects of architecture that are now thought to be 
iconically Muslim, such as the dome and the arch, were also borrowed from Roman and other 
cultures.  
During the Middle Ages, the Church authorities in Europe prohibited reading of ancient 
works that were thought to be contradictory to officially approved Christian teachings. This 
caused the narrowing of scholarship and eventually led to a general decline of learning, with 
some exceptions. However, even as Europe sank into its Dark Ages, the study of the writings 
from ancient Greece and elsewhere continued in what is now called the Middle East (Rubenstein, 
2003). Muslims encountered learned scholars who were well versed in the knowledge of the day. 
They came upon renowned academies of learning such as those of the city of Jondishapur, which 
was the intellectual center of the Iranian Sassanid Empire. It had been for centuries an institution 
for study and training that attracted Persian, Greek, Indian, and Roman scholars in medicine, 
philosophy, theology, and science. The followers of the Prophet Muhammad were keen to obtain 
these and other forms of knowledge.  
A translation movement ensued. Numerous manuscripts were rendered, mostly by 
Nestorian Christians, into Arabic. This increased access to the most advanced knowledge of the 
day and promoted intellectual growth.  Scholars of various religious backgrounds living in 
majority-Muslim lands contributed to the treasury of human learning. They provided original 
philosophical insights into old problems and introduced new modes of thought; discoveries were 
made in mathematics and various sciences and innovative techniques were developed (Bala, 
2006). The Canon of Medicine, a 14-volume medical encyclopaedia was completed by Ibn Sina 
(Latinized as “Avicenna”) in 1025. Based on a combination of his own practice and medieval 
medicine in Muslim civilizations as well as on the writings of the Indian physicians Sushruta and 
Charaka, ancient Persian and Chinese scientists, and the Roman sage Galen, it served for many 
centuries as a standard medical text in European universities and  the centres of learning 
elsewhere. The engagement with non-Islamic thought also produced some heated debates among 
Muslim philosophers, as when Zakariya al-Razi (Rhazes), drawing upon Platonic-Pythagorean 
influence, proposed that prophecy was superfluous. Ibn Tufayl wrote about independent human 
thought, equality, freedom, and tolerance—ideas that appear to have influenced Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke, Isaac Newton, and Emmanuel Kant (Attar, 2007). This was part of the massive 
transfer of knowledge from majority-Muslim lands to Europe in the time leading up to the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment. 
A key Muslim contribution was to the scientific method. Much of the knowledge of the 
ancient world was theoretical. The Qur’an encouraged the exercise of directly observing worldly 
phenomena as a means to understanding faith (din) and the material world (dunya). Practice of 
this method led to the growth of the empirical study as an important basis of scientific discovery. 
Among the earliest practitioners was the tenth-eleventh century optical scientist Ibn al-Haytham 
(Alhazen), who used the empirical method two hundred years before European scholars. 
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well as the direction of Mecca for the physical orientation of ritual prayer, prompted research 
into astronomy and geography. Highly accurate calculations were made in these fields. The 
intellectual culture of the lands under Muslim rule fostered exchange between learned 
individuals of various origins. Scholars of Muslim, Jewish, Christian, Hindu and other 
backgrounds thrived variously in Baghdad, Cairo, Cordoba, Delhi, Fez, Istanbul, Samarkand, and 
Shiraz. However, as was the case in other pre-modern civilizations, the community of scholars 
was a limited one with the vast majority of people being illiterate. 
By the time the European Renaissance was beginning to flower, an intellectual decline 
had begun to set in the East—firstly in Arab lands and later in others under Muslim rule. This 
was prompted, among other reasons, by philosophical and theological conformity (Fakhry, 1983; 
Hoodhbhoy, 1992). Conservative scholars expressed fierce hostility to the forms of thought that 
had been derived from non-Muslim sources. They promoted a limitation of theology to those 
origins considered to be authentically Islamic. In doing this, they sought to reverse generations of 
engagement with other cultures which had led to the evolution of many Muslim civilizations. 
They also fiercely attacked Sufis and the Shia as well as Sunnis who did not conform to the rigid 
practice of the faith that they preached. Their puritanical approach which deferred to the first 
three generations of Muslims gave rise to the Salafi movement among Muslims, which has 
grown  in influence in recent times. Conservative  influence in discouraging intellectual and 
cultural pursuits appears to have played a significant role  in the steady decline of Muslim 
achievements in science, philosophy, literature, art, and architecture.  
The Enlightenment in Western societies widened the scope of scientific inquiry and made 
it qualitatively different from that of previous eras (Hoodhbhoy, 1992). The arrival of European 
powers in Muslim domains in the 19
th century brought the realization of the extent to which the 
latter had fallen behind scientifically. Whereas  advancements in military armaments had 
paralleled those in other forms of technology when Muslim societies had flourished  their 
weaponry could no longer match that of the Europeans, who were embarking on colonization. 
Most Muslim-majority lands came under European control within a matter of decades. Even 
though colonial rule has now ended, Western societies continue to wield enormous influence in 
majority-Muslim countries economically and technologically. Whereas some adherents of Islam 
have sought to understand the cultural and philosophical bases of Western power, others have 
been wary of what they view as erosion of their ways of life. This perception is, of course, not 
limited to Muslims but is shared by many in other societies who have complained of Western 
cultural imperialism. However, the growing military presence of the Western states in Muslim-
majority countries in recent times has increased the fear among a significant number of Muslims 
of the threat posed to their cultural and religious integrity (Kull, 2011).  
This has led to a militant anti-Western posture and to acts of terrorism against Western 
targets by groups like al-Qaeda. Ironically, these militants have an affinity for things Western 
even as they attack Western targets. It is noteworthy that most of the hijackers of the attacks on 
September 11, 2001 had technical training, several of them in Western institutions of higher 
learning. Their worldview, which seeks a purity of religious piety, appears to be removed from 
their own experiences and the sources of their material knowledge. They find the justification for 
their  violent  actions in their interpretations of the Qur’an and the Hadith  while  others are 
inspired by these primary sources of Islam to embrace compassion and caring towards all of 
humanity. Such varied readings led al-Qaeda’s erstwhile leader, Osama bin Laden, to be treated 
simultaneously as a “controversial hero” by some Arab Muslims (Eid, 2008b) and a villain by 
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Even though contemporary states are engaged in serious discussions about democracy, 
human rights, and the ethical development of their societies, almost everyone comes to the table 
with bloody hands. No single philosophical tradition has successfully shown the way for the 
creation of utopia. Western technological innovations over the past centuries have provided 
many material comforts, but inequality, poverty, and suffering continue to haunt human beings—
including those living in the most developed countries. Whereas Western societies are continuing 
to be productive, contemporary non-Western cultures are increasingly making contributions to 
the advancement of human civilization. Global relationships are in the process of being re-
arranged, and Western societies will most likely not be the only leaders in scientific progress by 
the middle of the 21
st century.  
 
The Clash of Civilizations Thesis 
 
A key reason for Samuel Huntington to expound on what he viewed as “the clash of 
civilizations” was to propose a strategy to “revive the power of the West” (1996: 308). He 
borrowed the term the “clash of civilizations” from Bernard Lewis’s September 1990 Atlantic 
Monthly essay “The Roots of Muslim Rage”. However, Lewis—contrary to widespread belief—
was not the first to use it. It appeared as early as 1926 in a book titled Young Islam on Trek: A 
Study in the Clash of Civilizations, authored by Basil Matthews of the World’s Alliance of the 
Young Men’s Christian Association  (Bulliet, 2004). That publication has  languished in 
obscurity, but Huntington’s writings on this topic became influential because they appeared at 
the particular juncture of history when the end of the Cold War coincided with the attention-
grabbing terrorism of al-Qaeda. Having spent most of his academic career addressing national 
and international politics in the Cold War context, Huntington saw the emerging multi-polar 
global reconfiguration in the terms of security and military blocs. He offered a worldview in 
which civilizations were the most salient entities for cultural identification and political action: 
they were largely sealed off from one another and there was a high likelihood of conflict between 
them. This conceptual framework has been robustly challenged (e.g., Bulliet, 2004; Rubenstein 
& Crocker, 1994; Said, 2001, October 22) for its weaknesses in serving as a basis to analyze 
history, culture, and geopolitics. Nevertheless, it continues to hold sway among many scholars 
and policymakers who appear to be taken with its simple model in which humanity is divided 
into seven distinct civilizational entities. Huntington essentializes civilization as a social category 
that definitively shapes the worldview and solidarity of human collectivities: “differences among 
civilizations are not only real; they are basic” (1993: 25). The simplicity of his model veers 
towards the simplistic. 
Huntington constructs civilizations as watertight compartments of cultural purity and as 
separated by “fault lines”—a geological metaphor apparently implying that radical differences 
between civilizations are part of nature. Like medieval Muslim purists and their present-day 
successors, Huntington holds that cultural pluralism does not produce successful societies. He 
strongly opposes multiculturalism which he views as rejecting American heritage and weakening 
national solidarity. The United States can remain strong by vigorously guarding and enhancing 
its Western pedigree: the “futures of the United States and of the West depend on Americans 
reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization” (Huntington, 1996: 307). His prescription 
that “the West” should not seek to westernize the world in order to create a universal civilization 
is not based on the belief that it does not have anything useful to offer. Adhering to the notion of 
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itself to ward off challenges from Others. He proposes that international relations be re-organized 
in ways that civilizations, rather than individual states, become the primary interlocutors at the 
global stage. 
However, only some civilizations are capable of collaborative interaction, according to 
Huntington’s theory. He proclaims that the “conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural 
fault lines separating civilizations” (Huntington, 1993: 25). In this worldview “the West” and 
“Islam” are made particularly inimical to each other, with divergent values that make serious 
clashes between them inescapable. The scenario of inexorable conflict provides a strong 
justification to politicians who would not take up the arduous task of conciliation. It is also of 
utility to those who are in the highly profitable business of supplying the materials for making 
war and those who seek to gain geopolitical advantage and acquire control over resources. Belief 
in the model of inevitable civilizational clash has also proved ideologically useful to the Muslim 
militants who hold that Islamic ideals are essentially different from Western ones and that 
Muslims have a religious obligation to attack Western targets. The dominant interpretations of 
the attacks of 9/11  and the responses to them were shaped by the prevalence of this idea. 
Predictions of conflict therefore have become self-fulfilling prophecies, as a seemingly unending 
cycle of violence unfolds from decade to decade. Ignorant of the past and of the potential for 
present and future cooperation, religious and secular fundamentalists on both sides are bent on 
pursuing violent courses of revenge and counter-revenge. The withdrawal of Western armies 
from Iraq and Afghanistan and the tilt towards  democracy in certain Arab countries 
notwithstanding, the entrenched conviction that “the West” and “Islam” are destined to clash—if 
not countered—will continue to promote an intensification of the conflict.  
 
The Clash of Ignorance Thesis 
 
There have been numerous references to the term “clash of ignorance” by academics (e.g., Asani, 
2003; Georgiev, 2012; Hunt, 2002; Mishra, 2008), religious figures (e.g., Aga Khan, 2002, June 
23; Tauran, 2012, March 17), government leaders (e.g., Al-Nahayan, 2005, April 8; Ferrero-
Waldner,  2006, March 27), think tanks (e.g.,  Anna Lindh Foundation, 2010, September 16; 
CMIESI, n.d.), and others, since its emergence a decade ago. Edward Said appears to have 
coined it in a Nation magazine article which was published six weeks following the 9/11 attacks. 
The short essay was written as a critique of the clash of civilizations thesis and he seems to have 
offered the heading “The Clash of Ignorance” as a counter to the title of Huntington’s article 
(1993) and book (1996); its form mimicked and mocked the latter. Even though Said’s term does 
not work semantically in the same manner as the “clash of civilizations”, it draws on the latter’s 
widespread familiarity and, in the mere replacement of the last word, carries a jolt of irony which 
alternatives such as the  “clash stemming from ignorance” or “clashes based on cultural 
ignorance” do not.  
Some of the ideas in Said’s October 22, 2001 article had appeared previously in the 
afterword of the 1994 edition of his magnum opus, Orientalism, but he had not encapsulated 
them within the concept of the “clash of ignorance”. The 2001 piece was pithy and hard-hitting. 
It broached, among other issues, the motivations for promoting the clash of civilizations thesis; 
the disregard for complex histories; the reformulation of the Cold War model; the monolithic 
presentation of multifaceted entities—particularly “the West” and “Islam”; the drive to mobilize 
collective passions to gain geopolitical advantage; the distortion of religions by followers who 
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their history into Western domains and discourses; the ready calls to crusades and jihads; the 
failures by Muslims to acknowledge their own integration of Western technology and culture 
into their lives; the reduction of Islamic humanism, aesthetics, intellectual quests, and spiritual 
devotion to harsh penal codes by leaders of some majority-Muslim states; and the adherence in 
Western governmental circles to Huntington’s paradigm of inexorable clash.  
All this and more appears in the tightly-written 2,313 word essay. Limited by its format, 
it runs through a series of thoughts in a brisk, but not superficial, manner. Its rich allusions to 
ideas, events, history, politics, culture, and historical and contemporary figures remain unpacked: 
almost every paragraph deserves at least a chapter of commentary. The article has been cited 
many times, but with only a modicum of analysis. There does not appear to exist a full-fledged 
critical fleshing out of the skeletal thesis. Said, who died in 2005, did not publish again on this 
topic.  
The essay criticizes the clash of civilizations paradigm for promoting a tendency towards 
“vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed 
analysis” (Said, 2001, October 22). The clash of ignorance thesis does not position itself as a 
template for providing formulaic explanations of unfolding engagements between cultural 
collectivities. As opposed to the epistemologically rigid scope of the clash of civilizations model, 
it promotes a greater openness of inquiry. Said suggests that instead of the grand theory approach 
of  the clash of civilizations, “it is better to think in terms of powerful and powerless 
communities, the secular politics of reason and ignorance, and universal principles of justice and 
injustice” (Ibid). Such heuristic approaches facilitate critical analysis of the relationships 
between peoples in history and in our times rather than restrict them to ideologically limited 
modes of inquiry. The clash of ignorance thesis foregrounds the ways in which ignorance is 
formed, perpetuated, and exploited. Its relation to information, knowledge, and wisdom are also 
highlighted. However, whereas Said played a significant role in bringing attention to this 
fundamental problem, he merely scored its surface. Much more work remains to be done in 
developing a theory that provides an intellectual framework for examining empirical information 
about the issues of ignorance in intercultural communication. 
Of those who have referred to the clash of ignorance over the last decade, the Aga Khan 
has been the most persistent. Whereas this Muslim religious leader had raised issues related to 
the general problematic since the 1980s, he specifically began using the rubric of the clash of 
ignorance in 2002 (NanoWisdoms, n.d.). As head of an international development network, he 
has been engaged in education for several decades as well as serving as an Islamic interlocutor 
with Western governments and media. In contrast to Said’s role as an academic, the Aga Khan’s 
work relates to the practical matters of running several organizations. The various threads in his 
discourse include: intercultural ignorance inhibits the development of a common vocabulary with 
which to communicate across cultures; inter-faith dialogue based on mutual ignorance is a 
meaningless exercise; school curricula are failing to keep pace with 21
st century globalization 
that is increasingly bringing together people from around the world; the knowledge deficit 
resulting from cultural ignorance impedes predictability, anticipation, reflection, and dialogue; 
the gaps in cultural knowledge also pose a long-term obstacle to effective foreign and economic 
policymaking as well as to progress, justice, and stability; and the general failure of Western 
media to report on Muslim societies in an informed manner stems from the absence of basic 
knowledge about the latter in Western societies. 
The solutions that the Aga Khan proposes involve: reformulating the standards of general 
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in educational materials; understanding and adopting pluralism as a primary value for building 
harmonious and productive societies; fostering a cosmopolitan ethic; appreciating the place of art 
in  knowing  about the Other; learning to understand Muslim societies from a broad-based 
civilizational approach (i.e. through knowledge about peoples, cultures, languages, economies, 
geographies, and histories), rather than viewing them only through the lens of religion; and 
broadening Muslim societies’ engagement with their own ethnic and religious diversity. He has 
looked to putting these ideas into practice through his educational institutions and has sought to 
use his substantial art collection and programs of his Trust for Culture to familiarize Western and 
Muslim audiences with the achievements and diversity of Muslim civilizations. He has also 
encouraged  a Western country to engage internationally in addressing issues of intercultural 
relations through his partnership with the Canadian government to establish the Global Centre 
for Pluralism in 2006.  
Other major programmatic attempts to counter the clash of civilizations thesis have been 
the “Dialogue among Civilizations” and the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiatives. The former 
was promoted by the previous president of Iran, Mohammed Khatami. A foundation was 
established in Switzerland in 2007 and several international conferences have been held, but the 
Dialogue among Civilizations does not appear to be on the current Iranian government’s list of 
international priorities. The leaders of Spain and Turkey sponsored the Alliance of Civilizations 
initiative in 2005 to promote international cooperation against extremist militancy by 
encouraging intercultural and interreligious dialogue between the Western and Muslim societies. 
It runs international gatherings, programs, and training under the leadership of a United Nations 
High Representative. These initiatives implicitly subscribe to the philosophical stance of the 
clash of ignorance thesis. Along with the Aga Khan’s programmatic activities, they furnish 
practical examples for studying the usefulness of the concept in enhancing intercultural 
communication theory. 
The interdisciplinary study of intercultural communication emerged in the mid-20
th 
century in the effort to understand the interactions between people of different cultures, 
ethnicities, and nationalities. It is dominated by a positivist methodology that is based on the 
empirical examination of cross-cultural interactions in particular settings (e.g., Samovar, Porter 
& McDaniel, 2012). This approach does not lend itself well to the study of the issues of culture 
that go beyond personal or institutional interactions. Other contributions have been made in the 
area of cultural studies, whose political, economic, and social analysis seeks largely to uncover 
how meaning is produced and circulated through practices, beliefs, and institutions. This 
approach offers significant potential for studying the problem of ignorance in intercultural 
communication. Whereas most attention in cultural studies is focussed on contemporary 
societies, some work has been carried out in uncovering the historical causes of present-day 
cultural relations (e.g., Hall, 2000; Karim, 2003a). 
The clash of ignorance thesis underlines the role that the distortion of knowledge plays in 
impeding effective intercultural communication. A fundamental problem that it identifies is a set 
of prevailing beliefs about the relationship between the Self and a particular Other. The central 
assumption here is that differences with the Other are insurmountable and that interaction with 
her constitutes a game in which the inevitable outcome is a clash. Another is the supposition that 
one is engaged in a zero-sum game in which gains by the Other necessarily mean a loss for the 
Self. Ignorance is furthered through particular readings of the history of the relationship between 
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place, generation after generation, each producing “facts” and interpretations that come to form 
thick sediments of untruths.  
Even after painstaking efforts to uncover the layers of misinformation and to expose the 
ways in which “knowledge” is  constructed, the ingrained manners of presenting the Other 
continue to be promoted by those who benefit from them. It is in the self-interest of people in 
power  to  continue these tendencies in order to  preserve  their hegemony  (Karim, 2003a). 
Complex dynamics between knowledge and ignorance are shaped by ideology, economics, and 
the desire to maintain authority as well as by fear, habit, and unwillingness to acknowledge one’s 
errors. Ongoing exclusions of the vital contribution of Muslim philosophical and scientific 
traditions to Western societies in the intellectual histories written in Europe, North America, and 
Australasia would appear to validate Said’s (1994) critique that Western studies of the Orient are 
influenced by ideology. However, Said himself has been criticized for not recognizing similar 
tendencies by Muslims (e.g., Buruma & Margalit, 2005).  
In addressing both Western and Muslim societies’ uses of knowledge and ignorance, the 
clash of ignorance paradigm has shown itself to offer an analytical framework that enables a 
more even-handed approach than the one-sided critique of Orientalism.  The former does, 
however, appear to leave itself open to the charge of implying that it is ultimately possible to 
eradicate all clashes between groups once they understand each other. Even if perfect 
intercultural communication were attainable, this would not mean that the Self and the Other will 
come to agree on all matters. Contemporary  bodies  such as parliaments enable engagement 
between conflicting positions through discourse  domestically,  and diplomacy provides the 
potential for coming to an understanding at the international level. However, these institutions 
are not always successful in preventing violence. The proponents of the clash of ignorance do not 
suggest that violence is completely preventable. Their argument is formulated against the clash 
of civilizations paradigm, which holds that the fault lines between “the West” and “Islam” run so 
deep that never the twain shall meet. They are troubled that Huntington’s model provides the 
justification not to consider exploring possibilities for peacemaking. They promote the viewpoint 
that the Self and the Other do not necessarily have to clash, but do not say that this is completely 
avoidable.  
The clash of ignorance thesis makes a significant contribution to the understanding of 
intercultural and international communication as well as to the study of inter-group relations in 
various other areas of scholarship. It does this by bringing forward for examination the key 
impediments to mutually beneficial interaction between groups. This thesis directly addresses the 
particular problem of ignorance that other epistemological  approaches have not raised in a 
substantial manner: ignorance is not only the accidental absence of knowledge but is culturally 
constructed over generations and used politically. Whereas the critique of Orientalism deals with 
the hegemonic construction and exploitation of knowledge, the clash of ignorance paradigm 
broadens the inquiry  to include various actors whose respective distortions symbiotically 
promote conflict with each other. It supplements Michel Foucault’s (1980) power-knowledge 
dynamic to provide conceptual and analytical tools to understand the exploitation of ignorance 
for the purposes of enhancing particular groups’ or individuals’ power. The clash of ignorance 
thesis  also  highlights the value of taking into account the wider  historical, intellectual, and 
religious relationships between societies. Studying human beings through an approach that 
includes the examination of their spiritual and ethical aspirations in addition to their political and 
economic motivations will potentially reduce conflict between groups. Whereas questions of 
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clash of ignorance paradigm sharpens this approach to examine the broader implications of the 
systematic  corruption  of knowledge over long periods and the generational shaping of the 
imagination of large conglomerations of peoples. It also encourages the investigation of the 
interstices where the bodies of evidence on intercultural collaboration are concealed as well as of 
the manners in which this is done. The substantial epistemological potential of the clash of 
ignorance thesis to understand better how the Self and the Other imagine and engage each other 
will hopefully reduce the occasions for conflict and enable mutually beneficial relationships. 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1  The authors of this essay are working on a three-volume multidisciplinary publication 
project on the “clash of ignorance” that also involves other scholars engaged in the study 
of architecture, communication, conflict resolution, education, history, history of science, 
Islam, knowledge translation, literature, philology, political psychology, political science, 
and religion. 
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